The incoming Colombian government of Abelardo de la Espriella is poised for a complete reversal of its predecessor’s foreign policy toward Israel, marking a sharp ideological pivot and restoring a longstanding, yet complicated, partnership. This reset, expected to begin on inauguration day, August 7, moves Colombia from being one of Israel’s most vocal Latin American critics back toward a position of strategic alignment.
The planned changes are sweeping. They include:
- Restoring full diplomatic relations
- Exchanging ambassadors
- Lifting visa requirements
- Establishing a Colombian embassy in Jerusalem
- Withdrawing Colombia’s intervention in South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the ICJ
- Strengthening military and police cooperation
This dramatic shift was telegraphed after a mid-July meeting in Washington between Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar and Colombia’s incoming foreign minister, Omar Bula Escobar. It ends a diplomatic rupture that began in May 2024, when then-President Gustavo Petro severed ties, restricted defense cooperation and ultimately imposed a full ban on Colombian coal exports to Israel.
“The historic relationship that the Petro government unilaterally broke will be strengthened again,” the incoming president’s office stated, framing the move as a return to reliability. Critics, however, see an ideologically driven swing from one extreme to another, risking Colombia’s relationships elsewhere.
The Mechanics of a Reversal
Logistically, re-establishing ties may be simpler than it appears. The Israeli mission in Bogotá never fully closed, operating as a consulate even after relations were formally cut. “Restoring it to embassy status can therefore be accomplished more quickly than establishing an entirely new mission,” said Marcos Peckel, executive director of the Confederation of Jewish Communities of Colombia. He expects relations to be announced during or right after the inauguration.
Israel has already approved the appointment of veteran diplomat Vivian Aisen as its ambassador to Colombia. Colombia has not yet named its envoy to Israel. The next steps, Peckel notes, will likely involve restoring military and police attachés and expanding security cooperation that “had deteriorated under Petro but had never disappeared entirely.”
Yet de la Espriella’s vision extends beyond a simple return to the pre-2024 status quo. The promise to place an embassy in Jerusalem is its most potent symbol. “It was a campaign promise by the president, and he is going to fulfill it,” Peckel said. “Is it going to generate polarization? Yes. Is it going to generate debate? Yes.”
Petro condemned the proposal as “a grave offense to Muslim countries.” The Organization of Islamic Cooperation warned it could harm Colombia’s relations with its 57 member states, calling the plan contrary to UN resolutions on Jerusalem’s status.
Security Cooperation and Economic Undertones
The most substantive renewed cooperation will likely center on security. Before the break, Israel was a key supplier of military equipment, security technology and training for Colombia’s long fights against narcotics trafficking and armed groups.
Alberto Spektorowski, a political science lecturer at Tel Aviv University, predicts close collaboration. “Everything connected to state security will involve extensive collaboration with Israel,” he said. “Colombia will request it, Israel will provide it, and that relationship will become stronger.” He cautions, however, that this should not yet be described as a formal strategic alliance.
The economic front presents immediate tests. The incoming government has emphasized restoring commercial ties but has not yet issued a decree to repeal Petro’s ban on coal exports to Israel. Peckel expects its removal to be among the first post-inauguration actions. Janiel Melamed, a professor at Universidad del Norte, argued the coal ban was self-defeating. “It was a kind of shot in the foot,” he said. “The measure ended up being counterproductive to Colombia’s own national interests,” reducing royalty income that funds local infrastructure and services without critically harming Israel, which could find other suppliers.
Domestic Politics and Symbolic Battles
Analysts stress that for most Colombian voters, this geopolitical shift is secondary. “Economic performance, corruption and domestic security remain far more consequential than Middle Eastern affairs for the electorate,” Spektorowski said. He views the Israel-Palestine issue as a symbolic battleground in a larger political contest, where parts of the Latin American left have embraced the Palestinian cause and rising conservative movements have responded by making support for Israel part of their identity.
For Colombia’s Jewish community, the past two years brought strain. Peckel described “antisemitism from the state,” citing Petro’s repeated controversial analogies and statements. While communal life continued uninterrupted, “it generated concern and discomfort.” He now warns of a different risk under de la Espriella. “An excessively pro-Israel president can generate antisemitism and hostile declarations against us,” he said, fearing the community could again be treated as political stand-ins for a foreign government.
A Long Road Ahead
Reopening diplomatic channels is just the first step. Each major policy reversal—withdrawing from the ICJ intervention, repealing the coal decree and establishing the Jerusalem embassy—requires separate legal or administrative action. The government has also announced a more “neutral and consultative” stance at the UN, without specifying which resolutions it might now oppose.
The first step is the diplomatic question,” Spektorowski said. “It is to completely change the attitude toward Israel that existed under Petro.” Whether a deeper strategic alliance follows will depend on navigating the domestic and international fallout. The inauguration day announcements will set the direction. Building a relationship durable enough to survive Colombia’s next political shift will take years to determine.
