In July 2026, the political landscape in Hungary witnessed a profound and telling reversal. The Fidesz-KDNP parliamentary group, after sixteen years of governing with a supermajority, found itself in opposition. Its first major act was to file a series of petitions with the Constitutional Court. The target? The newly adopted Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments to Hungary’s Fundamental Law, which represented the first legal steps toward dismantling the Orbán-era system and restoring constitutional democracy.
This move is more than standard political opposition. It is a masterclass in strategic constitutional repositioning. Having spent years consolidating power through constitutional changes, Fidesz is now attempting to use the very same legal system it shaped to constrain its successors. The petitions challenge the amendments not on substance, which the court is barred from reviewing, but on a procedural argument: that the changes aren’t genuine constitutional amendments at all.
The Sixteenth Amendment introduced immediate, concrete reforms. It limited the Prime Minister’s tenure and created the framework to dismantle the sprawling network of “public-interest asset management foundations.” These entities, often criticized as vehicles for institutionalizing Fidesz’s influence, were to have their assets recovered for public use. The Seventeenth Amendment was broader, envisioning a full institutional reset. It included provisions for the removal of the President of the Republic, reforms to the Constitutional Court, term limits for MPs, and a reduction in the number of cardinal laws—a category of legislation requiring a two-thirds vote that Fidesz had extensively used to lock its policies in place.
Fidesz’s legal challenge rests on a clever, if contradictory, doctrinal pivot. Its argument has five revealing features that show how a party reconfigures its principles once it loses power.
- Power Limitations – The petitioners argue that the power to amend the constitution is legally limited, distinct from the unlimited power to write a new one.
- Labeling Doesn’t Determine Status – Merely calling something a constitutional amendment does not make it one if its provisions are individualized.
- Selective Reading of Restoration – They apply a selective reading to the stated purpose of “rule of law restoration.”
- Use of Legal Authorities – Their use of legal authorities is equally selective, citing pre-2012 case law.
- Invitation for EU Dialogue – The petitions request that the Hungarian Constitutional Court seek preliminary rulings from the Court of Justice of the European Union.
- Positional Nature of Doctrine – This case lays bare the positional nature of constitutional doctrine.
The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments introduce significant changes that can be understood in a table format:
| Amendment | Key Changes |
|---|---|
| Sixteenth Amendment | Limited Prime Minister’s tenure, framework to dismantle asset management foundations |
| Seventeenth Amendment | Removal of President, reforms to Constitutional Court, term limits for MPs, reduction in cardinal laws |
The irony is thick. Fidesz now wields the Court’s 2012 logic—developed to check Fidesz’s own overreach—against the new majority. It must frame its challenge within the narrow bounds of procedural review, a limitation it itself created to shield its amendments from scrutiny.
Third, the petitioners apply a selective reading to the stated purpose of “rule of law restoration.” They invoke this concept to critique the Sixteenth Amendment, even though that text doesn’t mention it. Yet they ignore the explicit restoration purpose stated in the Seventeenth Amendment’s text and supporting materials. Considering that broader purpose would frame the challenged measures—like applying a new retirement age to five Constitutional Court judges—as part of a legitimate democratic reconstruction. By avoiding this context, Fidesz isolates each provision, making it easier to paint them as illegitimate, personalized attacks.
Fourth, their use of legal authorities is equally selective. The petitions cite pre-2012 Constitutional Court case law, even though Fidesz’s own Fourth Amendment declared that such decisions had lost their force. They also appeal to international standards they long disregarded. One cited case is Baka v. Hungary, a European Court of Human Rights ruling that found Hungary violated judicial independence when it prematurely ended the term of Supreme Court President András Baka under Fidesz’s watch.
Notably absent is any engagement with recent international guidance on rule of law restoration. The petitions cite older opinions from the Venice Commission, a Council of Europe advisory body, but ignore its 2025 Updated Rule of Law Checklist and its opinion on Poland. These recent documents provide a framework for evaluating necessary, if difficult, judicial reforms during a democratic transition. Their omission allows Fidesz to cite European standards while sidestepping their application to the very process of democratic recovery.
Finally, the petitions request the Hungarian Constitutional Court to seek preliminary rulings from the Court of Justice of the European Union on issues of democracy and the rule of law. This is a significant tactical shift. For years, the Fidesz-aligned Court avoided dialogue with the EU’s top court. Now, Fidesz is urging it to ask whether the new government’s restoration measures comply with EU values. It is an attempt to recruit a supranational ally in its domestic fight.
This case lays bare the positional nature of constitutional doctrine. Principles become tools, their meaning shifting with the wielder’s relationship to power. The same party that built a system through constitutional amendments now calls those amendments illegitimate when used to dismantle that system. The standards once invoked to criticize Fidesz’s autocratization are being repurposed to obstruct the constitutional reconstruction that followed it. The legal battle over Hungary’s future has begun, and its opening argument is a lesson in political irony.
